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Treatment of the cost of corporate capital has been a significant
conceptual and operational problem for the federal tax on corporate
income throughout its history. While interest expense is currently
deductible in full from corporate income,' no deduction whatsoever is
permitted for dividend payments. 2 The unlimited deduction for cor-
porate interest payments originated in 1918 as a temporary measure
designed to equalize the effects of the World War I excess profits tax.3
Before 1918, only limited offsets against corporate income were granted
for interest payments, 4 apparently because Congress feared that cor-
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1. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 163. Special limitations on the deductibility of cor-
porate interest apply in cases of debt-financed acquisitions (§ 279), related taxpayers(§ 267), and interest relating to tax-exempt income (§§ 264-65).
2. But see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 247, first enacted in Revenue Act of 1942, ch.619, § 133, 56 Stat. 830, which permits public utilities to deduct dividend payments on
preferred stock issued prior to October 1, 1942.
3. The wartime revenue measure imposed a tax on corporate "excess profits," with
an "excess profits credit" (an amount of income not subject to this tax) for a specified
return on "invested capital." Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 300-28, 40 Stat. 1057.
As borrowed money was excluded from the definition of invested capital, Congress
thought it was "only fair" that interest on corporate indebtedness be fully deductible.
H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1918); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18,
§ 234(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1077.
4. An interest deduction for corporations was allowed when corporate income was
taxed briefly in 1894, Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556; but that levy,
along with the individual income tax, was ruled unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, which in-
troduced the 20th century tax on corporate income, permitted deduction of interest only
on an amount of indebtedness equal to a corporation's capital stock. Act of. Aug. 5,
1909, ch. 6, § 38(2e), 36 Stat. 113. When the individual income tax was enacted in 1913,
a process of increasing interest deductibility for corporations was begun, though no
reason was given for the change. But see Hearings on H.R. 3321 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 2058-61 (1913) (brief by Walker D. Hines); id.
at 2078 (brief by J.T. Clark). Interest could now be deducted on indebtedness equal to
one half the sum of outstanding stock and debt. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II G(b), 38 Stat. 172-73. The limitation was held constitutional. Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson,
240 U.S. 115, 118 (1916).
The Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 12(3d), 39 Stat. 768, permitted a deduction for
interest on debt equal to the sum of the total paid-up stock and one half of the
outstanding interest-bearing indebtedness. The 1913 limitation was criticized both in
the 1916 hearings and on the floor of the House because of the confusion it generated,
53 CONG. REC. 10656 (1916) (remarks of Rep. Sherley); Hearings on H.R. 16763 Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1916) (statement of Alfred Thom),
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porations would try to avoid taxation by substituting bonds for stock.0
When the excess profits tax was repealed in 1921, the full interest
deduction was retained as part of, the corporate income tax, without
any explanation by Congress in the legislative history."
Legal commentary on interest and dividend deductibility has con-
centrated on refining the statutory distinction between debt and equity
capital, 7 while economic analysis has been preoccupied with the effects
of differential treatment." This article inquires, more fundamentally,
whether the corporate interest deduction is justified as a matter of
policy; 9 it assumes that nondeductibility of dividends is firmly en-
trenched in the tax structure.10
I. Defining the Corporate Entity
Congress has chosen to regard the corporation as a taxable entity un-
der the current tax system, but that choice is only the beginning of
and its theoretical applicability to an excise, rather than an income, tax also prompted
criticism. Id. The 1916 limitation was held constitutional in Brushaber v. Union Pac.
R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 23 (1916), and was continued by the War Revenue Act of 1917, ch.
63, § 1207(l), 40 Stat. 334.
5. 44 CONG. REC. 4007 (1909) (remarks of Sen. Root). See also 53 CONG. REc. 10656
(1916) (remarks of Rep. Sherley); R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
46 (1940).
6. The Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 300-38, 42 Stat. 271-77, repealed the excess
profits tax as of January 1, 1922.
7. See Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 TAXES 830 (1956) (re-
vised version in 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 25 (1957)); Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin
Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 771 (1959), 43 MARq. L. REV. 31 (1959);
Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and Related
Problems, 16 TAX L. REV. 1 (1960); Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of
Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369 (1971); Semmel,
Tax Consequences of Inadequate Capitalization, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 202 (1948); Stone,
Debt-Equity Distinctions in the Tax Treatment of the Corporation and Its Shareholders,
42 TUL. L. REV. 251 (1968); Note, Toward New Modes of Tax Decisionmaking-The
Debt-Equity Imbroglio and Dislocations in Tax Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 HARv.
L. REV. 1695 (1970).
8. See Lent, Bond Interest Deduction and the Federal Corporation Income Tax, 2
NAT'L TAX J. 131 (1949); notes 105-17 infra.
9. No attempt is made to evaluate the multitudinous other tax consequences which turn
on classifying a corporate security as debt or equity. The principal factors to be con-
sidered in choosing the form in which to cast corporate capital are set out in B. BITrKER
& J. Eus-ric, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 4.01 (3d
ed. 1971). See also Plumb, supra note 7, at 376. Three of the most notable conse-
quences under the Internal Revenue Code are: (1) Payment for debt at maturity may
constitute a "reasonable need" under § 533(a) and thus avoid the accumulated earnings
penalty tax; (2) receipt of principal by a creditor is a tax-free recovery of basis with
the amount in excess of basis taxed as capital gain under § 1232, while a stock re-
demption may be taxed as a dividend under § 302; (3) losses incurred on the sale of
corporate stock are capital losses (unless the small business provisions of §§ 1242-44
apply), while bad debts may be deductible under § 166.
While all of these consequences now turn on whether a corporate security is classi-
fied as debt or equity, there is no reason to believe that a single touchstone should
ideally control such a variety of tax issues. Rather, each provision should presumably
be analyzed in terms of its underlying statutory purpose. This article is limited to an
exploration of whether the corporate interest deduction is so justified.
10. See p. 1609 infra.
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analysis. What elements constitute a corporation for the purposes of
taxation? Implicit in the answer one gives to that question is a deci-
sion as to whether interest payments should be deducted from cor-
porate income."
Four obvious models of the corporate entity present themselves,
each representing an increasingly narrowed view of corporate com-
position. First, the corporate entity might be identified as the aggre-
gation of all parties (management, workers, suppliers of materials and
services, suppliers of capital, and so forth) participating in the pro-
ductive enterprise. Taxable corporate income would be defined as the
receipts of that aggregation, with no deductions for payments to its
members. Second, the corporate entity for tax purposes could be iden-
tified as the assemblage represented by corporate capital, with income
defined as above, minus payments to managers, workers, and suppliers
of materials and services, but payments for corporate capital would not
be deductible. Third, the entity might be associated solely with the
residual capital or equity of the corporation, so corporate income would
be defined as in the second example, but with a deduction for the cost
of debt capital. Finally, the corporate entity might be identified as
what remains after payments to all participants in the enterprise. In
this case, payments for equity capital would also be deductible, so the
tax would be levied only on the year's undistributed earnings.
Traditional discussion of corporate structure and function implic-
itly adopts the third definition, thereby excluding debt capital from
the corporate entity and including only residual capital or equity in
the definition. Such discussion typically identifies the corporation
with shareholders' equity on the grounds of proprietorship: Just as
a sole proprietor owns his business, so it is said that stockholders own
their corporations.' 2 Yet the division of ownership rights in the cor-
porate context is now so complex as to require rejection of the sim-
plistic notion that stockholders can be considered "the owners" of the
corporation.' 3 Stockholders in large public corporations certainly can-
not exercise ownership rights over corporate assets in the same way
they can exercise control or dominion over personal assets or over the
assets of business proprietorships they may also own.' 4 Shareholder-
managers of closely held corporations may operate more like partners,
11. See Note, supra note 7, at 1706 n.56.
12. See note 44 infra; R. GooDE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 16-17 (1951); "W.
PATON, ACCOUNTING THEORY 75 (1922); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 178-79
(1972).
13. R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 179.
14. See generally A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
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a possibility the Internal Revenue Code explicitly recognizes,'i but
the source of their right to so operate lies as much in their managerial
as their stockholder status. Corporate law assigns control of the daily
operation of the business to the board of directors, not the share-
holders.16 In some respects, such as the right to dispose of particular
corporate assets, shareholders may actually possess fewer ownership
rights vis-it-vis the corporation than do secured debtholders.17
In short, ownership rights are divided among management and in-
vestment interests in the modem corporation.18 Management controls
the daily operation of the enterprise, while investors retain an interest
in the earnings of corporate assets. Shareholders typically have a resid-
ual but junior interest in those earnings, while debtholders generally
have a senior but limited interest. In addition, shareholders usually
possess the right to elect the board of directors; this right may or may
not give them effective control over the operations of management.' 9
The possibility of insolvency reorganization also gives debtholders at
least a contingent voting interest.20 This division of proprietorship
rights among shareholders, debtholders, and management renders the
simple equation of shareholder interests and the property rights of a
sole proprietor less than compelling.
More significantly, even if one were convinced that shareholders are,
in some meaningful sense, the proprietors of the contemporary cor-
poration, the relevance of that assertion to the definition of the cor-
porate entity appropriate for taxation is far from clear. National tax
policy choices cannot be preempted by the rather metaphysical con-
clusion that the "true nature" of the corporation is thus revealed. Nor
is the assertion convincing that because income from assets owned by
individuals is taxed to those individuals, so income from corporate
assets should be considered the residual accruing to shareholders as
the ultimate owners of the assets. That analogy begs the question.
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-79 (Subchapter S), permits certain small business
corporations to eliminate taxation at the corporate level, with corporate earnings taxed
directly to the shareholders. Such taxation is beyond the scope of this article.
16. See generally W. CALRi, CORPORATIONS 150-361 (4th ed. unabr. 1969).
17. Bonds are often secured by a mortgage or lien on specific corporate property.
In the event of a default by the corporation, the bondholders' trustee can theoretically
foreclose the mortgage and have the property sold. In general, such bondholder pro-
tective provisions actually operate to give the bondholders preferential treatment in
bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE
FINANCE 109-16 (1972); W. CARY, supra note 16, at 1285-87; W. PATON, supra note 12, at 77.
18. The classic statement of this thesis is A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 14.
19. See generally Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1427 (1964); Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLm.
L. REv. 399 (1962).
20. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRE~nsiN, supra note 17, at 119-25.
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Income from individually owned assets is taxed to the owners because
the taxable unit is initially defined as the individual. Property law
concepts of ownership define what belongs to each unit, but do not
determine this initial designation of the taxable unit. Similarly, view-
ing shareholders as corporate proprietors produces property law con-
cepts which might illuminate what belongs to the shareholders once
they were selected as the appropriate unit for taxation. Such concepts
do not, however, aid in that preliminary selection process.
To recapitulate, exclusion of debtholders from the corporate fam-
ily2' has traditionally been defended on the basis of property law con-
cepts of ownership. The application of those concepts to the modern
corporation is at least problematic; even if accepted as a matter of fact,
the ownership proposition nonetheless fails to satisfy in our context
because of its essential irrelevance to the definition of the taxable
unit. A more appropriate line of inquiry examines the implicit
definitions of the corporate entity that arise from various concepts of
corporate income to see if they explain why interest should be de-
ducted from corporate income, while no deduction is permitted for
dividends.
II. Is There a Conceptual Mandate for Retaining the Deduction?
A. Concepts of Corporate Income
The concept of net income is sometimes offered in justification of
the corporate interest deduction. According to this argument, interest
payments are as much expenses of producing income as are rent, wages,
and the cost of supplies or productive assets; thus denying deductibility
would make the tax pro tanto a levy on gross income. 22 Dividends, on
the other hand, are seen as a division of the profits of the enterprise,
and not an expense of doing business. 23 This distinction is sometimes
supported by an analogy between corporate and noncorporate business
enterprises. 4
The analogy is tempting but treacherous. If a sole proprietor bor-
21. The expression is taken from W. ANDREWS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 55.21,
at 862 (1969).
22. Plumb, supra note 7, at 625. See Cuyuna Realty Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d
298, 301 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
23. Jewell, The Tax Legislation Against Conglomerates-The Case Against the Tax
Legislation, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1073, 1078-79
(spec. ed. 1970); Comment, The Debt-Equity Question in the Federal Income Taxation
of Corporations: Will the New Section 385 Make Tax Planning a Reality?, 11 DuQ. L.
REv. 595, 598 (1973).
24. Goldstein, supra note 7, at 1-2.
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rows capital from a bank or insurance company, his interest payments
are admittedly as much a business expense as are payments for wages
or rent; one might think a corporate enterprise that borrows capital
should be treated no differently. This position, however, starts from
the assumption that shareholder equity is the appropriate entity for
corporate taxation; it implicitly adopts the third model of the cor-
porate entity. Before accepting this model, surely one should ask
whether the differences between natural persons and corporations
call for different tax treatment of the two.
One such difference illustrates and previews the problem. While it
is meaningful to distinguish between capital owned by an individual
and capital which he borrows, that dichotomy fails to make sense in
the case of a corporation since all corporate capital, whether equity or
debt, involves an obligation on the part of the corporation to someone
else, whether shareholder or debtholder. Payments by an individual
for money borrowed to earn money reduce accretion to the individual's
own wealth and are therefore deducted from the individual's gross
income while the earnings of capital are included.2 5 On the other
hand, since all the assets owned by a corporation are necessarily fi-
nanced by capital contributed by someone other than the corporation,
there is no corporate correlative to an individual's own wealth. Even
the year's undistributed earnings represent an increase in shareholder
equity. Accordingly, the deductibility of interest by individuals does
not provide a rationale for such deductions by corporations.
Stripped of analogies and assumptions which prejudice the answer,
the pertinent policy question is: Do concepts of corporate income
mandate inclusion in the corporate tax base of payments to corporate
investors with an unlimited but residual interest in corporate earn-
ings, but exclusion of payments to investors with a limited but prior
interest? Three concepts of corporate income will be examined in
search of an answer: increment in value, accounting income, and
income as product.
1. Corporate Income as Increment in Value
Recent American discussion of the appropriate base for income
taxation 26 has almost uniformly taken as its reference point the Haig-
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163, also permits the deduction of interest incurred
to finance personal consumption, a matter beyond the scope of this article.
26. See B. BiTTKER, C. GALVIN, R. MUSGRAVE & J. PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE IN-
COME TAX BASE? A DEBATE (1968); Aaron, What is a Comprehensive Tax Base Anyway?,
22 NAT'L TAX J. 543 (1969); Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
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Simons definition of income:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change
in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning
and end of the period in question. In other words, it is merely the
result obtained by adding consumption during the period to
"wealth" at the end of the period and then subtracting "wealth"
at the beginning. The sine qua non of income is gain, as our
courts have recognized in their more lucid moments-and gain to
someone during a specified time interval. Moreover, this gain
may be measured and defined most easily by positing a dual
objective or purpose, consumption and accumulation, each of
which may be estimated in a common unit by appeal to market
prices.27
Although Simons' famous formulation clearly referred to personal in-
come, the definition has sometimes been regarded as neutral with re-
gard to the taxable unit.28 Presumably, a corporation, as well as a
natural person, might therefore have income in the Haig-Simons sense.
What are consumption and accumulation for a corporate entity?
Whether consumption is defined as the "use of wealth for personal
gratification (final as distinct from instrumental use)" 29 or, more gen-
erally, as the destruction of economic resources,3 0 it is difficult to com-
prehend how a corporation can ever consume anything. A corporation
clearly cannot enjoy a glass of beer, destroying its utility for future
production. Just as obviously, the diversion of corporate funds from
production to support a symphony or art gallery may simply be a form
of advertising done to build corporate goodwill. When such diversions
are made to bring pleasure to corporate managers, employees or in-
vestors, without regard to corporate goodwill, it is the income of the
HARv. L. REV. 309 (1972). Recent discussion of "tax expenditures" (tax benefits which
are said to be the equivalent of budgetary expenditures because they are not necessary
to define income) often depends on the Haig-Simons definition to provide a model
of what income is, so that deviation from the ideal can be identified. See id. at 309 n.l.
27. H. SiMONs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
28. Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 63,
65 (1967). But see Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81 HARv. L.
REV. 1032, 1038 (1968); Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base:
The Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1968).
29. Break, Capital Maintenance and the Concept of Income, 62 J. POL. EcoN. 48, 52
(1954). For the classic definition of income as psychic satisfaction which is imperfectly
reflected by events in the physical world which, in turn, are indirectly measured by
consumption expenditures, see I. FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 5-6 (1930). The
Fisher definition of income as consumption leads necessarily to the conclusion that
corporations are incapable of income. I. FISHER & H. FISHER, CONSmUCTIVE INCOME
TAXATION 28-29 (1942).
30. H. SIMONS, supra note 27, at 49-50.
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managers, employees or investors which is increased in the Haig-
Simons sense. The corporation's position is the same as if it had made
salary or dividend payments to its managers or investors who then
purchased directly whatever benefits were derived from the symphony
or art gallery.
Only if a corporation made payments to an art gallery (or anyone
else) neither to build corporate goodwill nor to benefit any group
related to the corporation might the payment be considered consump-
tion as a wasting of economic resources. A wage earner who, for what-
ever reason, destroyed half his weekly wages would still include the
full amount in gross income. Is this not equivalent to a corporation
which engaged in inefficient or wasteful activities? To put the question
that way is to make evident the incongruity of the consumption con-
cept in this context. Waste and inefficiency in profit-making activity
are usually thought to result in less income rather than more. Cor-
porations are organized to produce, not to destroy.
If the incongruity of the consumption concept in the corporate con-
text is not surprising given the production role of corporations, the
notion of accumulation seems at first to accord with corporate enter-
prise. Some corporations do grow in assets and financial power, a
phenomenon which appears to be a correlative of individual aggre-
gation of wealth. The resemblance disappears, however, on examina-
tion: For any capital accumulated by a corporation, there necessarily
arises a series of obligations running from the corporation to its in-
vestors. It is therefore just as misleading to say a corporation accumu-
lates wealth as it is to say a business proprietorship accumulates wealth.
In both cases wealth is accumulated by the investors-debtholders and
shareholders in the case of a corporation.
Only if we are thus prepared to define corporate income as income
to corporate investors, qua corporate investors, does the Haig-Simons
definition provide a workable formula: the algebraic sum of (1) dis-
tributions to investors minus advances from investors, and (2) the
value of their investment at the end of the period minus its value at
the beginning.31 This definition reduces to the increment in the value
of the investors' interest, adjusted for capital additions or distributions.
In other words, it is the investors' accumulation and consumption
which is measured, since those concepts are without operational sig-
nificance for a corporation as distinct from its investors.
31. See P. HANSEN, THE ACCOUNTING CONCEPT OF PROFIT 39 (2d ed. 1972); Edwards,
The Nature and Measurement of Income, in STUDIES IN ACCOUNTING THEORY 70, 111
(2d ed. W. Baxter & S. Davidson eds. 1962).
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Alternatively, corporate income could be defined as the increment
in the value of the shareholders' interest, adjusted for capital additions
or distributions. Measurement of the investors' interest in general
would include interest payments in the tax base, while measurement
of only the shareholders' interest would exclude them. But the Haig-
Simons definition provides no conceptual corollary which requires
measurement of only the shareholders' equity. Nor does the objective
traditionally ascribed to the corporate firm, to earn money for the
shareholders,32 support the restriction since some of the money earned
in implementing that goal goes to senior investors. Thus even if the
essentially personal Haig-Simons definition is applied in this way to
derive a concept of corporate income,33 there is no conceptual man-
date for excluding interest payments from the corporate tax base.34
32. Bodenhorn, A Cash-Flow Concept of Profit, 19 J. FIN. 16, 31 (1964).
33. J. HicKs, VALUE AND CAPITAL (2d ed. 1946), provides an alternative definition of
personal income as increment in value. This definition can also be applied to corpora-
tions, but the value of the application is limited. Hicks suggests that income be
measured as "the maximum amount which can be spent during a period if there is
to be an expectation of maintaining intact the capital value of prospective receipts .... "
Id. at 172-73. When this definition is applied to corporations, income becomes the maxi-
mum amount which could be distributed to investors (or just shareholders) during the
period if there is to be an expectation of maintaining intact the capital value of pro-
spective receipts. See Peterson, Significance of Prospective Income Data, 41 ACCOUNTING
REV. 275 (1966).
While the concept of the maintenance of capital is a useful tool for economic analysis,
see generally Break, supra note 29, it adds little to the Haig-Simons formulation for tax
purposes. Where the two definitions differ, the former results in a purely hypothetical
figure. If applied as of the beginning of the accounting period, the Hicks definition in-
chides a hypothetical minuend: the excess of the capital value the enterprise (or just the
shareholder's equity) was expected to have at the end of the period over its capital value
at the beginning, adjusted for capital additions and distributions. See N. KALDOR, AN
ExPENDITURE TAX 62 (1955); READINGS IN THE CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT OF INCOME 5(R. Parke & G. Harcourt eds. 1969). If applied as of the end of the accounting period,
two formulations are possible. The first is simply the Haig-Simons definition: the ex-
cess of the capital value of the enterprise (or shareholders' equity) at the end of the
period over the capital value at the beginning, adjusted for capital additions and dis-
tributions. See Solomons, Economic and Accounting Concepts of Income, 36 ACCOUNTING
REV. 374, 376 (1961). The second requires a hypothetical subtrahend: the excess of the
value of the corporate enterprise (or shareholders' equity) at the close of the period
over its revised value at the beginning (as estimated at the close of the period) adjusted
for capital additions and distributions. J. HICKS, supra, at 178-79. See also N. KALDOR,
supra, at 67-68; Alexander, Income Measurement in a Dynamic Economy, in FIVE MONO-
GRAPHS ON BUSINESS INCOME 1 (Study Group on Bus. Income of the Am. Inst. of Ac-
countants ed. 1950). The relevance of actual occurrences for tax purposes has generally
led to the conclusion that such a hypothetical definition is not appropriate for defining
taxable income. N. KALDOR, supra, at 69-70. See also R. CHAMBERS, ACCOUNTING EVALUA-
TION AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 117-19 (1966); Alexander, supra, at 91-92; Bierman &
Davidson, The Income Concept-Value Increment or Earnings Predictor, 44 ACCOUNTING
REV. 239, 244 (1969); Dean, Measurement of Profits for Executive Decisions, 26 Ac-
COUNTING REV. 185, 186 (1951), reprinted in CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING AND ITS EN-
VIRONMENT 355 (J. Buckley ed. 1969).
34. Even assuming that the relevant increment in value accrues to the corporate en-
terprise generally, and not solely to shareholder equity, there is a final argument that
some interest should be excluded from the ideal corporate tax base. Plumb, supra note
7, at 627-28. The cost of capital can be conceptualized as the sum of (1) the cost of
using assets in a riskless enterprise, ie., what it is worth to have something now
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2. Accounting Income
Financial reporting has never adopted periodic valuation as the
means of determining income. 35 Instead, accountancy has taken the
familiar matching approach used in the statutory definition of taxable
income, measuring income as the excess of revenues over costs for a
particular period. There is, however, a superficial parallel between
accounting income and the notion of income as increment in value:
Accounting income, minus distributions to investors or owners, is the
increase in net worth as revealed by a comparison of the figure in the
balance sheet designed to reflect net worth at the end of the account-
ing period with that figure at the beginning of the period.36 Neverthe-
less, the parallel is misleading because the two concepts define corpo-
rate income quite differently. The realization criterion of accounting
requires that historical, rather than current, costs be used in the reck-
oning. Gains due to changes in expectations, as well as expected gains,
are not included in accounting income until they are realized; 37 under
the Haig-Simons definition of income unrealized gains would be in-
cluded immediately.38
Since an accounting is necessarily made to some person or group, a
point of view is always implicit in financial reporting. Not unlike the
concept of increment described in the last section, accounting income
or profit originally meant the addition to a proprietor's net worth
which derived from the operation of a business.3 9 While that concept
of income worked tolerably well in accounting for sole proprietorships
and partnerships, the rise of the great corporations made measurement
of corporate income for individual investors an impossible task be-
cause of the number and transience of investors in a single corpora-
tion. Thus the "entity" theory of accounting, in which the earnings
instead of in the future, plus (2) a premium for the risk entailed. V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 63-65. Since even a riskless enterprise would necessarily
incur the time preference component of the cost of capital in order to effect production,
it might be concluded that payments for time preference reduce increment as much
as payments for real, as opposed to financial, assets or services. That argument is, of
course, inapposite with regard to the existing corporate income tax since the cost of
equity capital also includes a payment for the riskless use of capital, but no deduction
is permitted for any part of dividends paid. Moreover, interest on debt cannot be re-
garded as the rough equivalent of the cost of using assets in a riskless enterprise nor
dividends on equity as the rough equivalent of a risk premium since equity instru-
ments can be purchased independently of debt instruments. Thus, the return on equity
instruments must include a pure time component as well as a risk premium.
35. See, e.g., Norris, Profit: Accounting Theory and Economics, in STUDIES IN Ac-
COUNTING 321, 325 (W. Baxter ed. 1950).
36. Solomons, supra note 33, at 376.
37. But see Alexander, supra note 33, at 93.
38. See Solomons, supra note 33, at 376-77.
39. Vatter, Origins of the Fund Theory, in CONTEMPORARY STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTION
OF ACCOUNTING THOUGHT 95, 98-99 (M. Chatfield ed. 1968).
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of the corporation are measured and reported quite apart from in-
vestors' income, gradually replaced the proprietorship theory.40 Like
the federal income tax system, accounting for financial reports early
conceived of corporate income as a distinct and identifiable quantity.
The treatment of corporate interest payments has been controversial
in financial reporting as well as in taxation because there remains the
unavoidable question: To whom is the accounting made?41 The tra-
ditional answer has been that accountants are to prepare reports from
the shareholders' point of view. 42 Not surprisingly, net income under
this view is defined as gross receipts minus operating expenses, taxes
and interest expenses, since it is the remainder which is available
either for distribution to the shareholders or for retention to increase
their equity. This shareholder perspective has been regarded as con-
trolling by the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, the body which authoritatively deter-
mined generally accepted accounting principles.4 3 Adherents of this
view typically support their choice on two grounds-that stockholders
are the legal proprietors of the corporation and that the reports are
actually directed to the stockholders. 44
For income tax purposes, however, neither of these reasons offered
for adoption of the shareholder point of view is compelling. The
analogy between stockholders and individual proprietors has already
been rejected. And the corporate income tax return is definitely a
report to the Treasury, not to the firm's own stockholders.
On the other hand, another view has persisted among accountants
over the years, the view that because debtholders and stockholders
both provide corporate capital, a more meaningful concept of corpo-
40. The leading exposition of the entity theory is W. PATON, supra note 12. Entity
income has been criticized as meaningless because income is calculated for a non-
existent personality. Vatter, The Fund Theory of Accounting and Its Implications for
Financial Reports, 17 STUD. Bus. Ao. 1, 33 (1947). Other theoretical approaches to in-
come definition which have been urged on the accounting profession include a "fund"
theory, id.; a 'residual equity" approach, Staubus, The Residual Equity Point of View
in Accounting, 34 ACCOUNTING REV. 3 (1959); and "value added concept of enterprise
income," Stlojanen, Accounting Theory and the Large Corporation, 29 ACCOUNTING REV.
391, 395 (1954).
41. S. GILMAN, ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS OF PROFITS 95 (1939). See also B. VAN ARKADiE
& C. FRANK, ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 28-29 (rev. Am. ed.
1969).
42. V. PATON, supra note 12, at 16, 75.
43. See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD OF THE AICPA, BASIC CONCEPTS AND ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 154 (1970) (state-
ment no. 4). The Financial Accounting Standards Board succeeded the Accounting Prin-
ciples Board in 1973 as the authoritative body for determining generally accepted ac-
counting principles.
44. R. SPROUSE & M. MOONITz, A TENTATIVE SET OF BROAD ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 37-38 (1962) (AICPA Accounting Research Study No. 3), de-
fines owners' equity as "the residual interest in the assets of an enterprise."
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rate income measures the earnings of a business entity without regard
to its plan of financing.45 Payments for wages, supplies and capital
equipment are regarded as costs, but interest payments, like dividends,
are considered distributions of profits rather than expenses of produc-
ing income. The point of view for such accounting shifts from the
shareholders to that of operating management46 (if taxes are also con-
sidered a distribution) or to that of investors in the corporation gen-
erally (if taxes are considered an expense). 47 The objective of account-
ing becomes recording and reporting "the activities of the firm with
respect to the utilization of the assets entrusted to it by all outsiders," 48
i.e., shareholders and debtholders in the case of a corporation. Often
called the net operating definition of income,49 this view carries the
imprimatur of the American Accounting Association, ° a group mainly
composed of accounting academicians. Its proponents argue that since
financial reports today provide information to a variety of groups,
such as government, management, unions, and the public at large,
the income concept can best be used for interfirm and interperiod
comparisons if it is defined independently of a corporation's financial
structure.5 1
There is nothing inevitable, then, about the shareholder viewpoint.
In the absence of some other reason to distinguish among corporations
on the basis of their capital structure, the accounting definition of in-
come-the nontax concept most closely corresponding to the statutory
definition of corporate taxable income-provides no mandate for de-
duction of corporate interest payments.
3. Corporate Income as Product
Edwin Seligman, the early champion of an income tax, favored a
corporate income tax base which included interest payments; at the
same time, he thought interest should be deducted in measuring the
net income of individuals. The concept of product-the output or yield
of productive assets or activities-provides the basis for his definition
45. N. BEDFORD, INCOME DETERMINATION THEORY: AN ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK 181.84(1965); W. PATON, supra note 12, at 266-68. But see Husband, The Entity Concept in
Accounting, 29 ACCOUNTING REV. 552, 560 (1954).
46. P. MASON, S. DAVIDSON & J. SCHINDLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF ACCOUNTING 281 (4th ed.
1959).
47. W. PATON & R. DIXON, ESSENTIALS OF ACCOUNTING 95-96, 121 (1958).
48. E. HENDRIKSEN, ACCOUNTING THEORY 31 (1970).
49. W. PATON, supra note 12, at 259.
50. AMERICAN ACCOUNTING ASS'N, ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARDS FOR COR-
PORATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND PRECEDING STATEMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTS 5 (rev. ed.
1957).
51. S. GILMAN, supra note 41, at 93-94.
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of income.5 2 "[I]ncome as a personal category"5 3 requires the reduc-
tion of the net product by interest on a debt contracted to secure that
product. Personal income is thus defined as "that which comes in to
an individual above all necessary expenses of acquisition, and which
is available for his own consumption."5 4 On the other hand, Seligman
defines corporate net income as "total annual revenue from all sources
minus all actual expenditures except interest and taxes." 55 Measure-
ment of corporate income does not require the additional reduction
since corporations are capable of only productive, not consumptive,
activities.5 6 No deduction is to be permitted for corporate interest
because debt and equity capital together represent the real assets of
the corporation, its "earning capacity."T
Seligman thus seems to suggest that corporate income can be defined
as the earnings of corporate assets. This tax base would not correspond
precisely with either a concept of income as increment in value (for
not all increases in the values of assets would be taken into account)
or with accounting income (unless the realization conventions of ac-
countancy were adopted in full). Like those concepts, however, the
view of corporate income as product provides no basis for interest
deductibility since the value of the earnings of a corporation's assets
is the same whether the assets are financed by the issuance of debt or
equity instruments. s None of these concepts of corporate income 9
provides a mandate for retaining the interest deduction; the discussion
therefore turns to an examination of rationales commonly advanced
for the corporate tax to see if the definitions of the corporate entity
52. E. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAx 12-13 (1914).
53. Id. at 19.
54. E. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 246 (9th ed. 1921).
55. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 52, at 19.
56. Id. at 685. Seligman recognized that, strictly speaking, his position demanded a
distinction between productive and consumptive credit in the case of individuals, but
saw the difficulties of drawing that line in personal taxation. See also Moonitz, Should
We Discard the Income Concept?, 37 ACCOUNTING REV. 175, 178 (1962).
57. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 54, at 246. Similarly, if a tax were levied on property-
the forerunner of product as the tax base-rather than income, an individual's net worth
(assets minus liabilities) would be the appropriate measure, while a corporation's property
would be measured either by its assets or by the sum of its equity and debt. E. SELIGMAN,
supra note 52, at 513.
58. See Tambini, Financial Policy and the Corporation Income Tax, in THE TAXATION
OF INCOmE FROM CAPITAL 185, 186-87 (A. Harberger & M. Bailey eds. 1969).
59. The concept of income is sometimes rejected as meaningless in the corporate
context. See, e.g., Peloubet, European Experience With Value-Added Taxation, in AL-
TERNATIVES TO PRESENT FEDERAL TAXES 64, 65 (Tax Institute of America ed. 1964); cf. M.
MOON Tz, THE BASIC POsruLATS OF ACCOUNTING 16 (1961) (AICPA Accounting Research
Study No. 1). If the point of income definition for tax purposes is to identify a fair
tax base, the concept of fairness has also been rejected as inapplicable to corporate
taxation. J. CHOWN, THE REFORM OF CORPORATION TAX 9 (Institute for Fiscal Studies
Pub. No. 2, 1971).
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implicit in any of them provide a satisfactory explanation for disparate
treatment of interest and dividends.
B. Rationales for the Separate Tax on Corporations
1. The Corporate Income Tax as an Adjunct to the Individual
Income Tax
Economists often observe that a corporation, unlike a natural person,
has no taxpaying ability of its own, so that whatever tax is levied on a
corporation in the first instance must ultimately be borne by natural
persons.60 Therefore some think that considerations of equity justify a
corporate income tax only to the extent necessary to reach the year's
undistributed corporate earnings-earnings which would otherwise
escape taxation under the realization criterion of the personal income
tax.61 Accepting this position means adopting, for tax purposes, the
fourth conception of the corporate entity, what remains after payments
to all participants in the enterprise. That conception itself mandates
like treatment of interest and dividend payments, here permitting
both to be deducted in full.
But replacement of the current corporate income tax with a tax on
undistributed earnings is extremely unlikely.62 Those who adhere to
this rationale for taxation of corporations have therefore argued for
a second-best solution, integrating the corporate and personal income
taxes to minimize double taxation of corporate earnings.6 3 A number
of suggestions have been made toward that end, three of which are
relevant for the purposes of this discussion: 4 provision for a credit
60. R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 173-74 (1959); 4 ROYAL [CANADIAN]
COMM'N ON TAXATION, REPORT 4-5 (1966). See also Klein, Income Taxation and Legal
Entities, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 13, 39 (1972).
61. Pechman, Further Comments on CTB, in B. BIrnKER, C. GALVIN, R. MUSGRAVE
J. PECHMAN, supra note 26, at 117; Klein, supra note 60, at 38; 4 ROYAL [CANADIAN]
COMM'N ON TAXATION, supra note 60, at 4-5.
62. See p. 1609 infra.
63. To the extent that one accepts the argument that the corporate income tax is
passed on to consumers (in the form of higher prices) or to workers (in the form of
lower wages), the problem of overtaxation of shareholders disappears. See R. GOODE,
supra note 12, at 44-72. The possibility remains that shareholders' income may be un-
dertaxed relative to other kinds of income. For recent discussion of the incidence of
the corporate tax, see note 138 infra.
64. In order to achieve some integration, an individual taxpayer was permitted an
exclusion of $50 of dividends from gross income as well as a tax credit for 4 percent
of the remainder of dividends received when the 1954 Code was enacted. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, ch. 1, §§ 34, 116, 68A Stat. 13, 37. The exclusion was increased to .$100 and
the credit repealed in 1964. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 201, 78 Stat.
31-32, Before 1936, integrated rates and a dividend exclusion were used to keep varying
amounts of corporate earnings from being subject to both the corporate tax and the
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against shareholder taxes for corporate tax payments, 65 provision for
a credit against shareholder taxes for a percentage of dividends re-
ceived,06 and exclusion of dividends from shareholder income. 67 Given
the taxation of returns to equity capital at the corporate level, these
proposals modify the taxation of shareholders so that, in general, in-
come reached by the corporate tax is not also taxed at the shareholder
level.0 8
Each of these second best alternatives would establish a corporate
tax system which accords with the rationale under discussion and
which maintains the deductibility of interest at the corporate level.
This tempts one to conclude that conceiving of the corporate income
tax as an adjunct to the personal income tax necessarily implies the
deductibility of corporate interest, even if dividends are nondeduct-
ible. The temptation should be resisted, however, for the "adjunct"
rationale is equally served by several other schemes, as long as interest
and dividends are treated alike. For example, the corporation could
be denied deductions for both interest and dividends paid, while
shareholders and debtholders receive a credit against their own tax
liabilities for tax payments made by the corporation on their behalf.
While this plan would require debtholders as well as shareholders to
compute their share of taxes paid by the corporation on corporate
earnings, it would have whatever advantages follow from treating debt
and equity identically at the corporate level. 9 Similarly, debtholders
could receive an exclusion or tax credit against their personal taxes
for a percentage of the interest paid them by the corporation. Thus
the practical second-best solutions offered to implement the view of
the corporate income tax as an adjunct to personal income, solutions
which are based on the assumption that dividend payments are not
deductible, provide no guidance for solution of the problem at hand.
As long as interest and dividend payments are not included in both
individual income tax. See generally Shoup, The Dividend Exclusion and Credit in the
Revenue Code of 1954, 8 NAT'L TAX J. 136 (1955).
For current proposals for more substantial integration, see R. GOODE, supra note
12, at 181-202; J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 141-42 (2d ed. 1971). One possibility
for integration not mentioned in the text, taxation of undistributed earnings to share-
holders as is done currently in the case of partnerships, would eliminate the separate
tax on corporations.
65. See Break, Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income Taxes, 22 NAT'L
TAX J. 39 (1969).
66. A dividend credit for shareholders was part of the original Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. Int. Rev. Code* of 1954, ch. 1, § 34, 68A Stat. 13. See note 64 supra.
67. A partial exclusion for dividends received by individuals is found in Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, ch. I, § 116, 68A Stat. 37. See note 64 supra.
68. For a discussion of the effect of the shareholder's personal tax rate on the
degree of minimization of the double tax, see J. PECHNAN, supra note 64, at 142-46.
69. See pp. 1603-08 infra.
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corporate taxable income and the taxable income of security holders,
the solutions are neutral with regard to which of these taxable units
is to be allowed the deduction, exclusion, or credit.
2. Other Rationales
A separate tax on corporate income is sometimes considered appro-
priate because of the privileges and benefits granted corporations by
the state, such as perpetual life, limited liability for investors, and
marketability of shares.70 Under this view, the corporate income tax
is an impersonal tax on doing business in the corporate form.7' The
benefit rationale has been subjected to considerable criticism. 2 But
if it is accepted in spite of its defects, corporate income should be pre-
sumably defined to include returns to whoever benefits from the
corporate form. Shareholders benefit since the return on their invest-
ment is possible only in the corporate context. Yet the same can be
said for investors in many corporate securities, such as bonds, which
pay a fixed return. Indeed, the amassing of capital and the develop-
ment of certain enterprises made possible by the corporate form may
also be of very great benefit to managers, employees, and suppliers.
Unless there were some way to distinguish among beneficiaries of
the corporate form, the benefit rationale for taxation would therefore
imply that a more expansive view of the corporate entity is required
for tax purposes; it suggests defining the corporation as the aggrega-
tion of all participants in the productive enterprise and thus taxing
returns that accrue to all of them.73 Rather than mandating main-
tenance of the interest deduction, such a definition implies that neither
interest nor dividend payments should be deductible.
70. J. PECHNIAN, supra note 64, at 105-06.
71. Report of the Committee of the National Tax Association on Federal Taxation
of Corporations, 32 NAT'L TAX ASS'N CONF. PROC. 534, 577-78 (1939) [hereinafter cited
as Nat'l Tax Ass'n Rep.].
72. Criticism has centered on isolating the precise benefits and assessing their re-
lationship to taxpaying ability. The benefits may be those accruing to business generally,
such as governmental policies favoring expansion, id. at 537. If this is so, however,
why limit the tax to corporations, particularly if the result is an inefficient allocation
of resources between the corporate and noncorporate sectors? R. MUSGRAVE, supra note
60, at 177-78. If only corporate benefits are considered, the nexus between the special
advantage conferred on corporations and taxpaying ability has been considered dubious
on the theory that the availability of these legal privileges to all for the asking should
reduce their monetary value to zero under free competition. Groves, Equity and Ex-
pediency in Business Taxation, in How SHALL BUSINESS BE TAXED? 33, 37 (Tax Policy
League ed. 1937); cf. Musgrave, Should an Absolute Corporation Tax Be Retained?, 40
NAT'L TAX ASS'N CONF. PROC. 111, 112 (1947). Finally, concession of the legitimacy of a
special tax on corporations does not explain why the tax should be levied on net in-
come as opposed to gross receipts, sales, or some other base. Nat'l Tax Ass'n Rep.,
supra note 71, at 565-68.
73. That conception has, of course, never been reflected in the statutory income
tax base.
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Sometimes the separate tax on corporate income is defended as a
great revenue producer, necessary to the maintenance of the modern
public treasury.74 If that is the only rationale for the levy, there is
considerable reason to deny all deductions, including those for pay-
ments for corporate capital, since the tax base would consequently be
expanded and the revenue yield increased. Although revenue produc-
tion can hardly be used as the sole, or even primary, guide to tax
policy, that rationale provides no mandate for excluding debtholders
from the corporate family.
A fourth argument for a separate tax on corporations has been
located in the alleged need for control of corporate power75 or of
"persistent monopoly elements in corporate profits."7 The superiority
of the tax mechanism over direct regulation in ending whatever abuses
are alleged is surely open to question, 77 but even if those doubts were
resolved in favor of the tax system, adoption of this rationale fails to
provide a clear choice as to the appropriate composition of the taxable
entity. If it is the amassing of capital which makes possible the unde-
sirable aggregation of corporate power, payments for capital in what-
ever form provided should presumably be included in the tax base.
Alternatively, if the tax were designed to reach only rents as econo-
mists define that term, here, the "difference between a firm's total
revenues and its total costs," a deduction should be permitted for all
costs, including the cost of capital, whether debt or equity.78 Without
a clear conception of the social evil which supposedly inheres in the
corporate form, this rationale thus fails to imply a definite choice
regarding deductibility of payments for corporate capital. Neither of
the alternatives suggested, moreover, offers support for differential
treatment of interest and dividend payments.
In spite of the discriminatory effects often attributed to the corpo-
rate income tax,79 a number of economists have suggested that the tax
might be justified by its economic effects. It has been argued that cor-
porate income taxation is entirely compatible with the goals of fiscal
policy, 0 though that rationale suggests no basis for limiting the tax-
74. See, e.g., Slitor, The Corporate Income Tax: A Re-evaluation, 5 NAT'L TAx J.
289, 290 (1952).
75. R. MUSCRAVE, supra note 60, at 178.
76. Slitor, supra note 74, at 302.
77. H. GRovEs & R. BiSH, FINANCING GOVERNMENT 178-79 (7th ed. 1973).
78. R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 230. On the concept of economic profit generally,
see Weston, The Profit Concept and Theory: A Restatement, 62 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1954).
79. The tax is said to discriminate against the corporate sector, against capital-
intensive activities within the corporate sector, and against equity capital among forms
of capital. THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL, supra note 58, at 2.
80. See generally R. GOODE, supra note 12.
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able entity to shareholders' equity. The tax has also been embraced
as one of the built-in stabilizers of fiscal policy, helping to avert serious
economic downturns and dangerous booms.8' As deductions for busi-
ness expenses and interest restrict the corporate tax base to returns
above fixed charges, deductibility may promote stabilization since the
remaining tax base is likely to be more responsive to changes in busi-
ness conditions than returns to assets in general. Even assuming its
effect is thus leveraged, however, the absolute impact of the corporate
income tax on stabilization may not be great.8 2 Unless that impact
were significant, the case for the tax as a compensatory mechanism
would not outweigh other arguments against the interest deduction. 3
3. Policy Conclusions and Summary
The policies said to underlie federal income taxation of corporations
fail to explain why interest is deductible in full from the corporate
income tax. The adjunct to personal income taxation rationale comes
closest. It provides a clear conceptual mandate, that only undistributed
yearly earnings be taxed to corporations. Once that alternative is re-
jected as inconsistent with the present statute and unlikely to be real-
ized in legislation, the second-best plans are neutral regarding choice
of the taxable unit that may deduct or exclude payments for corporate
capital. Viewing the corporate income tax purely as a benefit tax or
as a revenue producer leads to the conclusion that payments for both
debt and equity capital should be included in the corporate tax base.
The other rationales8 4 for corporate taxation are less convincing as
81. A. HANSEN, ECONOMIC ISSUES OF THE 1960s, at 140 (1960). See also Slitor, The
Role of Corporate Income Taxation, 7 NAT"L TAX J. 227, 232-35 (1954).
82. J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
337 (5th ed. 1973); Kust, Appraisal of the Corporate Income Tax, in ALTERNATIVES TO
PRESENT FEDERAL TAXES 17, 20 (Tax Institute of America ed. 1964).
83. See pp. 1603-08 infra.
84. There are several other rationales for the corporate income tax which should
be noted, although they are more problematic than those discussed in the text. With
regard to public corporations, it has been argued that the tax can be justified on the
basis of a "partnership principle": The government is seen as a sort of silent non-
voting partner which shares in the profits and, to some extent, the losses of the en-
terprise. CoIm, The Corporation and the Corporate Income Tax irn the American
Economy, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 486, 495 (Supp. 1954). If the government's share can be
viewed as a distribution of profits rather than as a cost, presumably the same is true
of the share which goes to debtholders.
A variety of arguments have been made that corporations possess taxable capacity
quite apart from that of individuals. While these assertions are typically worked out
only imperfectly, none appears to mandate the interest deduction.
(1) The ability to pay taxes has been said to inhere in the productive activity of
business organizations, just as it does in the consumptive ability of individuals. Sec
Buehler, The Taxation of Business Enterprise-Its Theory and Practice, 183 ANNALS
96, 97 (1936). Adoption of a tax based on this assertion would not lead to differential
treatment of debt and equity since assets are productive no matter how financed. A
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justifications for the tax itself and either fail to mandate clearly the
appropriate definition of the corporate entity for taxation or suggest
conceptions that would not distinguish the treatment of payments for
debt and equity capital. Given the inclusion of shareholders in the
corporate family, they thus provide no explanation for the different
treatment accorded debtholders.
III. The Case for Repeal of the Corporate Interest Deduction
A. The Case for Equivalent Treatment of Debt and Equity
Judicial decisions have developed innumerable guidelines for im-
plementation of the statutory distinction between debt and equity. 5
At the extremes there is wide agreement on the definitions: the
"classic debt is an unqualified obligation to pay a sum certain at a
reasonably close fixed maturity date along with a fixed percentage in
prior governmental claim for its share of the return to assets prevents assertion of
inability to pay taxes by a high debt firm on the grounds that all returns had been
paid to debtholders. This rationale more logically supports a tax based on the rate
of return to assets, Buehler, Ability to Pay, I TAX L. REv. 243, 255 (1946). For such a
tax, see Blakely & Zehms, A New Look at the Corporate Income Tax, 20 TAX EXEC.
287 (1968). But see Morton, A Comment on "A New Look at the Corporate Income
Tax," 21 TAX EXEC. 195 (1969).
(2) Large corporations have been said to possess a "higher capacity to pay taxes
than small firms" because they (i) can average taxable income over a period of years,
(ii) are better able to obtain capital from capital markets (and are therefore less de-
pendent on reinvestment), and (iii) call for managerial investment decisions more likely
to involve factors other than prospects of earnings from new ventures. Musgrave, supra
note 72, at 115-16. If this rationale is used to tax at least some corporations, differential
tax treatment should turn on the size of the firm, not its plan of financing.
(3) It has been suggested that the tax is justified on the ground that the corporation
is a personality, not just in the eyes of the law, but that it is a real entity capable
of paying taxes. R. GOODE, supra note 12, at 25; Adams, Fundamental Problems of
Federal Income Taxation, 35 Q.J. EcoN. 527, 543 (1921). See also Studenski, Toward a
Theory of Business Taxation, 48 J. POL. EcoN. 621, 633 (1940). Embracing this rationale
requires considerable faith in personification, but even true believers must concede that
there are differences between corporate and natural persons which might justify dif-
ferential tax treatment. Thus the rationale would call for a corporate interest deduction
only if the reasons for permitting such deduction by individuals also applied to cor-
porations, an application rejected at pp. 1589-90 supra.
The argument has been advanced that the corporate income tax should be retained
because it is an old tax and the burdens and benefits of an old tax will have been
adequately capitalized by the market. R. GOODE, supra note 12, at 204-05; Discussion, 40
NAT'L TAX Ass'N CONF. PROC. 120-21 (1947). This argument implicitly opposes any
change in the tax structure whatsoever and must be rejected if discussion of reform is
to be meaningful. The legitimate equity concern which underlies the argument can be
met by the development of adequate transitional rules for any proposed change. See
p. 1618 infra.
Finally, the corporate income tax has been thought to provide economic policymakers
with additional tools for stabilization, such as the investment tax credit. Break, supra
note 65, at 40. Elimination of the interest deduction would not seem to preclude the
manipulation of the corporate tax base for such policy purposes.
85. The cases are collected in 4A J. MERTENs, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§§ 26 .10-26.10e (1972); 2 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAATION 195-236 (1973); Plumb, supra note 7, at 370 n.8.
1603
The Yale Law Journal
interest payable regardless of the debtor's income or lack thereof."80
Common stock with voting rights is the classic example of equity. The
essential difference between debt and equity is usually said to be
whether the funds are put at the risk of the business, with the equity
investor foregoing a fixed return and insolvency priority in exchange
for the residual interest and a greater degree of control over manage-
ment. 17 From these conceptions come a number of formal attributes
which are said to pertain to one category or the other.8
That these differences disappear as the categories converge is well
known: Subordinated debt is treated as equity by most institutional
investors and other senior creditors; 9 income bonds with a distant
maturity date are difficult to distinguish from preferred stock, espe-
cially if dividends are mandatory when earnings exist.90 Equally famil-
iar is the observation that differences in the terms of debt and equity
investment contracts are less observed in practice than in theory. Man-
agement tends to view preferred stock much as it would bonds, paying
the full dividend regularly as a matter of policy, 91 while traditional
creditors' rights on insolvency were long ago eroded by the develop-
ment of reorganization remedies under federal bankruptcy law.92
Moreover, even where clear contractual differences do exist, debt
and equity serve the same economic function for the corporation in
that both provide financial capital, albeit at different costs depending
on the terms of the investment contracts and the prevailing conditions
in the relevant capital markets. 93 Today, investors and managers alike
regard at least bonded indebtedness as a permanent part of corporate
capital structure, not as a mere temporary borrowing.9 4 The job of
the corporate financial manager is to use the alternatives of debt and
equity in such a way as to minimize the cost of the firm's capital. 5
86. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957) (Medina, J.).
87. Goldstein, supra note 7, at 3; Plumb, supra note 7, at 404; Stone, supra note
7, at 257.
88. See Plumb, supra note 7, at 412-57.
89. Everett, Subordinated Debt-Nature, Objectives and Enforcement, 44 B.U. L. Rv.
487, 489 (1964); Johnson, Subordinated Debentures: Debt That Serves as Equity, 10 J.
FIN. 1, 2 (1955).
90. Comment, Bonds-Income Bonds-Rights of Bondholders and Deductibility of
Interest for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1334, 1339-40, 1351 (1958).
91. P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS & G. DONALDSON, BASIC BUSINESS FINANCE 366 (3d ed. 1966).
92. See Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CI. L.
REv. 565, 566 (1950). Accordingly, it has even been suggested that the added rights of
bondholders under an indenture are of little significance. N. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOssIcs
oF CoRPoRATE ENTERPRISE 132-35 (1940).
93. See V. BRUDNEY &- M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 82-84, 314-405.
94. F. THOmPsON & R. NORGAARD, SINKING FUNDS 37-38 (1967).
95. There is considerable dispute among financial theorists over whether the cost of
corporate capital can actually be lowered by altering the debt-equity mix as conventional
analysis suggests. The classic article, Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Cor-
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From the investor's point of view, debt and equity are also alternative
means of providing corporate capital, with differences in risk, priority,
maximum yield, and control determining the order of claims on fu-
ture earnings of that capital.906
This identity of the function of debt and equity instruments forms
the core of the case for equivalent treatment of interest and dividend
payments. Since "interest and dividends both represent divisions of
the net earnings on invested capital," 97 disparate tax treatment results
in an arbitrary differentiation of corporate income. 9 Whatever con-
tractual differences there are between debt and equity instruments,
they are not decisive in defining the concept of corporate income, and
they do not refute the argument for equivalent tax treatment of in-
terest and dividend payments. 99
A second argument for equivalent treatment of debt and equity
arises from the litigation imbroglio generated by treating them dif-
ferently. The fears that influenced Congress before 1918 were well-
founded. 10 When the nontax consequences are slight, as in closely
held enterprises, corporations and their investors have a powerful
incentive to characterize an investment contract as debt in order
to avoid taxation of corporate receipts at both the corporate and the
investor levels. The resulting tidal wave of litigation has produced
only confusion and a torrent of contradictory commentary.' 0 ' The
Supreme Court has refused to face the issue in a quarter century, 10 2
while Congress withdrew in 1969 by granting the Treasury Depart-
ment power to end the confusion by regulation, 03 a power the Secre-
poration Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. EcoN. REV. 261 (1958), asserts
that a firm's cost of capital is independent of its capital structure. The empirical results
of this position are surveyed in S. DOBROVOLSKY, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION Fi-
NANCE 124-28 (1971). For arguments attacking this proposition, see J. VAN HORNE, Finan-
cial Management and Policy 159-61 (1968). The conventional analysis appears in B.
GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTrLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 539-49 (4th ed. 1962).
96. Lent, supra note 8.
97. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSrEIN, supra note 17, at 365.
98. Lent, supra note 8, at 141. The theoretical equivalence of debt and equity has been
widely accepted. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 14, at 279; V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 82-84; H. GROVES & R. BIsH, supra note 77. at 179; Baumol
& Malkiel, The Firm's Optimal Debt-Equity Combination and the Cost of Capital, 81 Q.J.
ECON. 547 (1967); Linter, The Financing of Corporations, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SocIry 166 (E. Mason ed. 1959). But see Miller, The Corporation Income Tax and Cor-
porate Financial Policies, in STABILIZATION POLICIES 381, 426 (Staff Report to the Comm'n
on Money and Credit 1963).
99. See pp. 1589-98 supra.
100. See pp. 1585-86 supra.
101. See notes 7 & 85 supra.
102. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946) (last Supreme Court case
on point). Subsequent denials of certiorari are collected in Plumb, supra note 7, at 370 n.8.
103. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415, 83 Stat. 613, adding § 385
to the Internal Revenue Code. The House version of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 contained a definition of debentures which was eliminated by the Senate in its
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tary has yet to exercise. Elimination of the debt-equity distinction
would be the most efficacious method of eliminating the litigation
imbroglio created by the as yet unrepealed temporary legislation of
1918.
A third argument for eliminating the distinction arises from the pos-
sible presence of tax incentives for debt financing under the current
tax structure. While the litigation imbroglio has been largely limited
to close corporations,10 4 both large and small corporations are said to
benefit from the tax treatment of debt, the former because their after-
tax cost of nonshareholder capital is reduced, and the latter (which
may have only limited access to outside financing) because the double
taxation of corporate returns is eliminated pro tanto by designating
part of the shareholders' interest as debt1 °5 The lower net cost of cor-
porate capital brought about by the deductibility of interest payments
has thus been thought to bias capital structures in favor of debt,10 6
supposedly resulting in an inefficient unneutrality in the tax struc-
ture.107
Encouraging debt is usually considered undesirable for two reasons.
First, a financial structure in which much of the capitalization requires
payment of large fixed returns will be considerably more susceptible
criticism of the House's definition of the term "security." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. A98-AIOO (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954). Legislation was
introduced in the House in 1959 creating safe harbors for debt instruments, but it also
failed to be enacted. H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). See also ALI FED. INCOME
TAX STAT. § XS00(g) (Feb. 1954 Draft): ABA Taxation Section, Recommendation No.
9, 81 ABA REP. 160 (1956); Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Sub.
chapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Ways and Means
Comm., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 473, 501-02, 579 (Revised Report on Corporate Distribu-
tions and Adjustments 1958).
104. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 364; Goldstein, supra note 7, at 5.6.
105. Plumb, supra note 7, at 373. Comment, Stockholder Loans and the Debt-Equity
Distinction, 22 STAN. L. REV. 847, 848-49 (1970), suggests that closely held corporations
are benefited more than public corporations because a stockholder of the former is
willing to lend money in amounts and at interest rates not available to the latter in
the capital markets.
106. See, e.g., S. DOBROVOLSKY, supra note 95, at 335-36; W. LEWELLEN, THE COST OF
CAPITAL 32-52 (1969); D. SMITH, EFFECTS OF TAXATION: CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 12,
25-26 (1952); Brewer & Michaelson, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment: Comment, 55 AM. ECON. REv. 516, 520-22 (1965); Cook & Cohn,
Capital Structures of Electric Utilities Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
45 VA. L. REV. 981, 997-98 (1959); Hamada, Portfolio Analysis, Market Equilibrium and
Corporation Finance, 24 J. FIN. 13 (19 6 9 )i Howell, The Effects of Federal Income
Taxation on the Form of External Financing by Business, 4 J. FIN. 203, 216 (1949);
Johnson, supra note 89, at 10; Miller, Corporate Taxation and Methods of Corporate
Financing, 42 AM. ECON. REV. 839 (1952); Modigliani & Miller, supra note 95, at 272;
Modigliani & Miller, Corporate Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction, 53 AM.
EcON. REV. 433, 438-42 (1963).
107. Groves, Preliminary Report of the Committee on the Federal Corporate Net In.
come Tax, 42 NAT'L TAX ASS'N CONF. PROC. 437, 447-48 (1950). But see Slitor, supra
note 74, at 298-301; Smith, Effects of Taxation on Corporate Financial Policy: A Progress
Report, 42 NAT'L TAX Ass'N CONF. PROC. 69 (1950).
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to default and bankruptcy or reorganization when income fluctuates
than will a structure with small fixed charges. Second, even if actual
insolvency is avoided, the cure has been said to encourage socially un-
desirable activities such as speculation,'"8 undermaintenance of cor-
porate properties, and reduction of wages or employment. 0 9 As a re-
sult, experts in corporate financial policy have, since the 1930's, com-
mended the efforts of state and federal regulatory bodies to reduce.
fixed charges to income and, at the same time, criticized tax incentives
for debt. 10
Although the nexus between the deductibility of interest from the
federal corporate income tax and the encouragement of debt financing
at first appears clear in theory, it has been somewhat difficult to estab-
lish as a matter of empirical fact. Among lawyers advising closely held
corporations, it is apparently common knowledge that debt is substi-
tuted for stock largely for tax reasons."' The effect of the tax differ-
ential on public corporations and the aggregate effect on corporate
financing, on the other hand, have been more problematic. While
corporate tax rates have risen substantially since the 1920's, and while
there has been an increase in the ratio of corporate debt to equity in
recent years, empirical studies have failed to reveal any significant ef-
fect of the tax system on debt financing.1 2 One such study found in
examining individual cases, some influence of tax factors on corporate
financial structure, particularly in the substitution of debt for pre-
ferred stock. But it concluded that the statistical evidence makes it
difficult to justify elimination of interest deductibility solely on the
108. Rostow & Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X
and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1375 (1939).
109. H. GROVES, POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 31-35 (1946).
110. B. BinrKRE & J. EusriTc, supra note 9, at § 4.01. The possibility that the na-
tional economy could benefit from increased debt financing has not received a cor-
responding treatment. Id. In addition, the corporate interest deduction has been criti-
cized in recent years as an inducement to corporate acquisitions. H.R. REP. No. 413,
91st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 102-03 (1969); Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2404, 2419 (1969)
(statement of Dr. Willard Mueller, Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Comm'n).
As a result, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 added § 279 to the Internal Revenue Code,
limiting the deductibility of interest on "corporate acquisition indebtedness." See also
Sherman, How Tax Policy induces Conglomerate Mergers, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 521 (1972).
111. B. BirriER S. J. EuscE, supra note 9, at § 4.02. See also H. GROVES, PRODUC-
TION, JOBS AND TAXES 25 (1944).
112. Lent, supra note 8, at 133-37; Miller, supra note 98, at 385-426. See also B.
MOORE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF FINANCE 80 (1968); R. GOODE, supra note
12, at 137; S. KUZNETS, CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 276-90 (1961); May, Cor-
porate Structures and Federal Income Taxation, 22 HARV. Bus. REv. 10, 15 (1943); Sil-
berman, How Much Can Business Borrow?, FORTUNE, June 1956, at 131; Sametz, Trends
in the Volume and Composition of Equity Finance, 19 J. FIN. 450 (1964); Schwartz &
Aronson, Some Surrogate Evidence in Support of the Concept of Optimal Financial
Structure, 22 J. FIN. 10 (1967); Shapiro & White, Patterns of Business Financing: Some
Comments, 20 J. FIN. 693 (1965).
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basis of its discriminatory effects.'" 3 Although the primacy of tax
considerations can thus be identified in particular cases, 1 4 students
of finance have been unwilling to single out tax treatment as the
cause of whatever increase in debt has been observed in general.ln
Indeed, reexamination of the theoretical approaches to the problem
produces models that regard the effect as having differing degrees of
significance." 6
In short, the effect that tax incentives have on debt financing is veri-
fied in certain specific cases, debated in the aggregate, and either
straightforward or attenuated in theory depending on which model
one chooses. To the extent that it is considered significant, the tax
incentive for debt financing argues for elimination of the differential
treatment of debt and equity."17
113. Lent, supra note 8, at 141. For similar conclusions regarding the substitution
of debt for preferred stock in a particular industry, see Molloy, Federal Income Tax
Aspects of New Trends in Railroad Corporate Finance, 12 TAx L. REV. 113 (1957).
114. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELsTEIN, supra note 17, at 355; J. DUE & A. FRIED.
LAENDER, supra note 82, at 336.
115. R. GOODE, supra note 12, at 138; J. PECHMAN, supra note 64; TAx FOUNDATION,
INC., THE CORPORATE INCOME TAx 62 (1968); Loomis, That Epic Corporate Bond Binge,
FORTUNE, Feb. 1968, at 125; Personal Investing: An Oversupply of Stocks, FORTUNE, June
1970, at 171; The Morgan Guaranty Survey, The Anatomy of Debt, July 1966, at 3, 6.
116. On the one hand, it has been asserted that focusing on the incremental (as
opposed to average) cost of corporate capital over a substantial period leads to the
conclusion that corporations do indeed expand their debt in accordance with the tax
incentive to do so. Tambini, supra note 58, at 215. On the other hand, economic
models have been developed to indicate that when the preferential treatment of capital
gains is taken into account, the combined effect of tax provisions further limits the
cases in which the net tax incentive for debt is significant. While the corporate in-
terest deduction may lead lower bracket shareholders to prefer a high corporate debt
policy, the potential for deferral and the lower effective rate on capital gains may
induce high bracket shareholders to prefer a low corporate debt policy. Farrar & Selwyn,
Taxes, Corporate Financial Policy and Return to Investors, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 444 (1967);
Lintner, Dividends, Earnings, Leverage, Stock Prices, and the Supply of Capital to
Corporations, 44 REv. EcoN. &- STAT. 243, 267 (1962); Myers, Taxes, Corporate Financial
Policy and the Return to Investors: Comment, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 455, 459 (1967N; Stapleton,
Taxes, the Cost of Capital and the Theory of Investment, 82 ECON. J. 1273 (1972); Stiglitz,
Taxation, Risk and the Allocation of Investment in a Competitive Economy, in STUDIES
IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKETS 294, 348-51 (M. Jensen ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as Risk and Allocation]; Stiglitz, Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy, and the Cost of
Capital, 2 J. PuB. EcoN. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Taxation and Cost]. See also S.
DOBROVOLSKY, supra note 95, at 99-117; Miller, supra note 98, at 429 n.37; Smith, supra
note 107, at 73. Finally, it has been suggested that the disadvantages of potential bank-
ruptcy offset whatever tax advantages militate for corporate debt. Baxter, Leverage,
Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital, 22 J. FIN. 395 (1967); Kraus & Litzenberger, A
State Preference Model of Optimal Financial Leverage, 28 J. FIN. 911 (1973); Robichek
& Meyers, Problems in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, 1 J. FIN. & QUANT.
ANAL. 1 (June 1966). See also Stiglitz, Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate
Finance: Bankruptcies and Take Overs, 3 BELL J. EcoN. Me;T. Sd. 458 (1972).
117. To the extent that the interest deduction currently encourages debt financing,
repeal would presumably induce a shift to equity financing: neutrality at the corporate
level, coupled with capital gains treatment of equity at the shareholder level, could
have this effect. Equity financing would not involve financial dangers comparable to
those inherent in too much debt. The effect of denying the interest deduction on
corporate investment decisions is another matter. See pp. 1615-17 infra.
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B. The Case for Repeal of the Interest Deduction
The case for the equivalent treatment of debt and equity ultimately
becomes a case for repeal of the deduction. The alternative solution,
granting a deduction for dividend payments, is simply too remote to
merit serious consideration. Enactment of such a deduction would
mean that the corporate income tax would reach only the annual un-
distributed earnings of the corporation; the legislative history of
revenue acts, the response of the business community to such a tax,
and the large revenues produced by the present tax make such a
change highly unlikely. Although this conception of the corporate
income tax was partially implemented during the Roosevelt admin-
istration,1" 8 repeal quickly followed. 1 9 Corporate managers had ex-
perienced intense shareholder pressure to distribute earnings
currently in order to reduce corporate tax payments, and this develop-
ment was said to threaten economic growth.120 An alternative explana-
tion is available for the business community's opposition to a tax on
undistributed earnings: Management generally desires to avoid cap-
ital markets when internal funds are available for investment,' 2 ' and
the pressure to distribute earnings if dividends were deductible would
probably lead to increased reliance on capital markets for new funds.
Finally, the great revenue productivity of the current levy makes con-
gressional enactment of a dividend deduction for corporations an
unrealistic expectation for tax reformers.12 2 Accordingly, this article
now turns to an examination of the potentially adverse effects that
repeal of the interest deduction might bring.
118. The Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 14, 49 Stat. 1648, imposed a surtax on un-
distributed corporate profits. The surtax rate was graduated in accordance with the
portion of corporation profits which were retained. Proposals to restrict the corporate
income tax to undistributed earnings have received considerable academic support. See
note 61 supra.
119. The Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, §§ 13-15, 52 Stat. 447, greatly reduced the
surtax rate on undistributed profits for 1938-39 and provided for its expiration at the
end of 1939.
120. See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); SEN. REP. No. 1567, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
121. R. GOODE, supra note 12, at 196.
122. Plumb, supra note 7, at 623, 627. In 1973 the corporate income tax produced
.539,045,309 in tax revenues, accounting for 16A percent of all tax revenues. 1973
COMM'R OF INT. REV. ANN. REP. 89.
A final argument for repealing the interest deduction should be noted. Because in-
terest charges are deductible from the corporate income tax, the impact of interest rates
which are increased to achieve the goals of monetary policy may be weakened, A. BuRNs,
PROSPERrY WITHOUT INFLATION 46-47, 53 (1957), though there is disagreement among
economists as to whether the interest deduction actually interferes with monetary policy.
See Miller, supra note 98, at 432-35.
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IV. Effects of Repeal of the Interest Deduction
A. Alternatives to Debt
Inclusion of interest payments in the corporate income tax
base is sometimes opposed on the ground that such treatment might
simply shift the focus of tax minimization by encouraging alternatives
to long-term indebtedness, such as leasing and short-term borrowing. 2 3
Put differently, if the concept of corporate income mandates the de-
ductibility of operating, but not financial, charges, the former will be
substituted for the latter. The short answer to this objection is that
payments for the use of financial capital, which are disguised as pay-
ments for real goods or services, should be treated as are undisguised
payments for the use of financial capital.
1. Leases
The advantages of leasing rather than purchasing assets under cur-
rent accounting and tax rules have been extensively analyzed 24 and
need not be reviewed here except to indicate how leases should be
treated if the corporate interest deduction were repealed. The pur-
chase of a depreciable asset, with funds advanced by either debtholders
or shareholders, would, after the repeal, give the purchaser a deduc-
tion for depreciation of the asset's cost and an investment tax credit
if the asset qualified, but no deduction for use of the debt or equity
capital. If instead of purchasing an asset the corporation entered into
an arrangement such that it paid "rent" over the asset's lifetime, char-
acterization of the transaction as a lease would permit the corporation
to exchange the tax advantages of ownership (the depreciation deduc-
tion and investment tax credit) for a rent deduction which would in-
clude two components: the equivalent of principal payments for the
asset and the equivalent of interest payments on indebtedness incurred
to purchase the asset. Substitution of the first component of the rent
123. Id. at 626-27. See also Lent, supra note 8, at 140.
124. See Baskes, Tax Planning for Lease Transactions, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 482, 483;
Cary, Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax,
and Policy Considerations, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1948); Davis, Tax Consequences of Leasing
Transactions, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 56; Gant, Illusion in Lease Financing, 37 HARv. Bus. REV.
121 (March 1959); Goldstein, Equipment Leasing After the 1969 Act, N.Y.U. 29TH INsr.
ON FED. TAX. 1589 (1971); Meyer, Tax Aspects of Lease Transactions, 23 TAX ExEc. 616
(1971); Olson & Wisniewski, Leasing: The Current Tax Picture in Rental of Industrial
Facilities and Equipment, 29 J. TAX. 12 (1968); Robertson, Leasing Arrangements-
From the Investor's Viewpoint, 46 TAxES 787 (1968); Vandervicken, The Powerful Logic
of the Leasing Boom, FORTUNE, Nov. 1973, at 132; Zeitlin, Tax Planning in Equipment.
Leasing Shelters, 1969 S. CAL. TAX INST. 621; Comment, Acquisition of Industrial and
Commercial Equipment Through Leasing Arrangements, 66 YALE L.J. 751, 770 (1957).
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deduction for ownership tax consequences would result in a tax ad-
vantage for the lessee if (a) the asset were nondepreciable, (b) depre-
ciation were allowable at a slower rate than the principal were amor-
tized, or (c) the tax advantages of ownership were worth more to the
lessor than the lessee, with the latter benefiting through a reduced
rental rate.
These advantages of leasing do not depend on interest deductibility
and already require a distinction between "leases" and "purchases"
under the Code. 125 Elimination of the interest deduction, and the
corresponding creation of a tax advantage in the substitution of the
second component of the rent deduction for interest, would not there-
fore create a new conceptual problem for the tax system. Determina-
tion that a lease transaction was actually a "purchase" would mean,
under the principles developed in this article, that the lessee-owner
could deduct depreciation and could use the tax credit for qualified
assets, but could not deduct the interest implicit in the rental-pur-
chase payments.
Even if a lease is not a disguised purchase, it might be argued that
part of the rental is a substitute for interest. 20 Suppose an asset with
an expected lifetime of 30 years is rented for a 20-year term. Assuming
the life expectancy of the asset is sufficiently long relative to the term
of the lease (and the rental sufficiently low relative to the asset's fair
market value) to preclude treating the lease as a purchase, should
rental payments be deductible if interest payments are not? Unless
some adjustment were made in the rental deduction, corporate debtors
might rent real assets from would-be lenders instead of borrowing
their money to purchase such assets. Alternatively, corporate lessors
might actually be debtors making interest payments over the course
of the rental period in the form of rental services, the value of which
exceeds that of rent received at the beginning of the period. But con-
ceding that rental payments or services, even in the case of a true
lease, may be partial substitutes for interest does not require the con-
clusion that all rent or all costs should be included in the corporate
tax base if all interest is. Instead, only that portion of the rent or costs
which functions as interest should be denied deductibility. 27
125. See, e.g., Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959); Baskes,
supra note 124, at 483.
126. See R. GOODE, supra note 12, at 179-80.
127. The disparity that exists in the tax treatment of the purchaser and the lessor
may seem unwarranted by the practical differences in the transactions: A person who
"rents" an asset for its total useful life may be denied any rent deductions be.
cause the transaction is seen as a disguised purchase; a person renting the same
asset for a few years less than its useful life may receive deductions for all or most
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Identification of that portion will be easier if four cases are con-
sidered: (1) payment of rent for the use of a building or machinery
as the asset is used, without a commitment to purchase more of such
services over time; (2) a contractual commitment in period one to
purchase goods or services in period two with payment in period one
or two; (3) agreement at the beginning of a period of time to rent an
asset for the period, but with payment in a lump sum at the beginning
of the period; (4) purchase of rental services to be provided over time
as in (3), but with payment also spread over the contract period.
In the first case, payments are made as the services are provided
without a contractual commitment for the purchaser to continue buy-
ing, or the seller to continue providing, use of the rented asset. Thus
the buyer purchases (and the seller sells) only real services, with
neither paying anything for time preference or the risk of nonper-
formance. Similarly, payment in period two in case (2) would involve
no interest payment from the buyer to the seller since the goods and
the payment would be simultaneously exchanged. On the other hand,
payment in period one in case (2) would imply an interest payment
by the seller to the buyer since the price to the buyer in period one
would be discounted to its then present value. The seller would, in
effect, borrow cash from the buyer and would repay the loan with
goods or services which are worth more than the principal amount.
The excess over the principal amount of the loan is the equivalent
of interest.
In the third case, a lessee might pay a single lump sum in year one
for the right to use an asset for the next twenty years. Likewise, a
corporation could pay a single lump sum for telephone or labor serv-
ices to be provided over several years. Such a lump sum is the total
of a series of present payments for future services, with each such pay-
ment equivalent to the individual prepayment discussed in case (2).
Therefore, the lessee makes no payment for either time preference or
to compensate the lessor for the risk it might not be paid in case (3).
Rather, the prepaid lessor is, as in case (2), paying interest to the lessee
over the term of the lease. It is as though the lessee had bought a
of his payments because the transaction would be regarded as a true lease. See
p. 1613 infra. This disparity follows from the conceptual discontinuity between renting
and owning an asset: Both the Internal Revenue Code and conventional accounting
practices require that a particular transaction be made to fit one category or the other;
there is no intermediate concept. Zeitlin, supra note 124, at 642-43, suggests that an
intermediate tax concept is needed. He finds that the closest formulation is the ac-
counting rule that certain borderline transactions may be treated as leases rather than
purchases, but that their existence must be disclosed in a footnote to the financial
statement. However, Zeitlin acknowledges that this formulation is not really useful
for tax purposes.
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single premium term annuity from the lessor, who makes the annuity
payments in the form of services rather than cash. Accordingly, none
of the lessee's payments should be denied deductibility, while some
component of the lessor's costs should be disallowed as interest if the
lessor is a corporation.
In case (4), a corporate lessee also purchases the right to use an asset
for a period of time, but pays for that right over the course of the
period. From an investor's point of view it might be desirable to cap-
italize the series of future expenditures as a liability on the lessee's
balance sheet, rather than adopt the more usual treatment of annual
charges to income. 128 For tax purposes, however, only the interest im-
puted as a part of this obligation should theoretically be disallowed.
Since the term of the lease can be made the same as that in the lump
sum payment case, the lessee can be assumed to bear the same risk
of price fluctuations as in case (3), but its aggregate payments will nec-
essarily be larger because of the deferral of rent and the risk of its de-
fault. That difference is not, however, equivalent to interest if the
analysis above of case (2) is accepted. The annual payments by the
lessee are simply a series of individual payments for services which
are all contractually committed in advance. The difference between
cases (3) and (4) arises not because the lessee borrows from the lessor
in case (4), but because the lessor borrows from the lessee in case (3).
Accordingly, the lessee should be permitted a full deduction for rental
payments in case (4) unless those payments are deferred beyond the
time at which the rented asset is used.
128. Cary, supra note 124, at 12 n.28. The accounting treatment of leases is still a
matter of controversy. Until very recently, generally accepted accounting principles re-
quired disclosure of material leases which involved "the right to use property and a
related obligation to pay specific rents over a definite future period" and recordation
as purchases of leases which were "clearly in substance installment purchases of property."
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD OF THE AICPA, REPORTING OF LEASES IN FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS OF LESSEE %1 14-15 (Opinion No. 5, 1964). See also ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
OF THE AICPA, ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF LESsORS (Opinion
No. 7, 1966); COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES OF THE AICPA, ACCOUNTING RE-
SEARCH BULL. No. 43, ch. 14 (1953); J. MYERS, REPORTING OF LEASES IN FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS (AICPA Accounting Research Study No. 4, 1962); Wyatt, Accounting for Leases,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 497, 498-99.
Prodded by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Accounting Principles Board
has broadened the requirements of disclosure regarding noncapitalized leases for fiscal
periods ending on or after December 31, 1973. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD OF THE
AICPA, DISCLOSURE OF LEASE COMMITMENTS BY LESSEES (Opinion No. 31, 1973). Un-
satisfied, the Commission has modified Rule 3-16 of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-16(1973), to require additional disclosure-notably of the present value of "financing
leases" and of the impact on net income of such leases-for financial statements sub-
mitted to the Commission subsequent to November 30, 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 29215 (1973).
The end is not yet in sight because the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the
successor to the Accounting Principles Board), to which both the Commission and the
Accounting Principles Board had referred the problem of accounting for leases, has
yet to speak.
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To recapitulate, leases which are actually purchases under existing
rules would be treated as are undisguised purchases. Other leases may
involve imputed interest for either the lessor (if a lump sum rental is
received at the beginning of the lease term) or the lessee (if rental
payments are deferred beyond receipt of rental services). The logic of
this article would deny deductibility of only such imputed interest for
corporations, not all rental payments. That result is not without prec-
edent in the Code, 129 and should be modified only when the admin-
istrative costs of imputation are greater than the gains.
2. Short-Term Loans and Deferrals
The analysis of the last section fails to consider the length of time
a payment must be deferred before a portion can be considered in-
terest. Disallowance of deductions for interest or long-term corporate
indebtedness has been opposed because it would provide an incentive
to shift financing to short-term debts which, though subject to renewal,
should presumably be treated as operating charges.' 30 The same rea-
soning would apply to short-term deferrals which are not loans in form.
Yet if interest on long-term notes is to be denied deductibility, there
is no logical basis on which to distinguish interest on shorter term
notes or deferrals. Indeed, it is not altogether outrageous to charac-
terize suppliers, who extend trade credit for 30 to 90 days, as providing
corporate capital in exchange for an explicit or implicit financing
charge.' 31 Similarly, employees who defer salary payments until after
the end of a working period are, in effect, involuntary creditors of the
corporation. 32
In theory, the interest component which is implicit in such short-
term deferrals should not be deductible by a corporation, though isola-
tion of such interest may not be worth the cost in many such cases.
Perhaps a flat rule permitting deferral for a very limited period could
be adopted, though the period should not be so long as to make at-
tractive the creation of revolving credit arrangements as a substitute
for longer commitments of capital. In any event, the theoretically
129. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(b) imputes an interest charge in certain install-
ment purchases of personal property or educational services. Section 483 provides that
where no interest is stated in a deferred payment contract for the sale or exchange
of property (or where the interest stated is substantially below the market rate) part
of each payment must be treated as interest for tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1
Cums. BULL. 54 held a "loan processing fee," sometimes referred to as "points," de-
ductible as interest.
130. Lent, supra note 8, at 140. See also Plumb, supra note 7, at 586.
131. W. PATON, supra note 12, at 65-66.
132. Id. at 260-62.
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correct solution, denial of all corporate interest deductions, should
again be modified in practice only where the benefits of imputing
interest are exceeded by the cost of imputation.
B. Economic Efficiency
1. Allocation of Corporate Investment
As noted in the discussion of tax incentives for debt financing, the
deductibility of corporate interest is widely regarded as affecting cor-
porate decisions on how to finance corporate investments. 33 More-
over, the proposition that the interest deduction lowers capital costs
has led to the conclusion that the interest deduction also affects cor-
porate investment decisions.13 4 Projects which are profitable when the
cost of debt may be deducted from a corporation's taxable income
might not be profitable if tax costs were increased by the inclusion of
interest charges in the corporate tax base. Accordingly, it has been
argued that disallowing the interest deduction would lead to a reduc-
tion in the amount of corporate investment, 13 perhaps inducing the
substitution of labor for capital inputs.' 36
This asserted reduction assumes the corporate income tax is not
shifted forward to consumers or backward to workers, 37 although the
actual incidence of the tax is widely disputed among economists. 138
More importantly, if the corporate income tax does fall on corporate
capital,139 it is not clear that the net effect of including interest in the
133. See pp. 1606-07 supra.
134. W. LEWELLEN, supra note 106, at 32-52; Jorgensen, Anticipation and Investment
Behavior, in BRoOKINGS QUARTERLY ECONOMERIc MODEL OF THE UNITED STATES 35, 87
(J. Dusenberry, G. Fromm, L. Klein & E. Kuh eds. 1965); Miller & Modigliani, Estimates
of the Cost of Capital Relevant for Investment Under Uncertainty, in DErERMINANTS OF
INVESrMENT BEHAVIOR 179, 186 (R. Ferber ed. 1967); Modigliani & Miller, supra note
95, at 295; Modigliani & Miller, supra note 106, at 440-41; Stapleton, supra note 116,
at 1282, 1288.
135. V. BRUDNE & M. CHiE.SErEIN, supra note 17, at 365; D. SMITH, supra note 106,
at 26.
136. See R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 230.
137. But see J. PECHMAN, supra note 64, at 120-21.
138. H. Groves, supra note 111, at 27,. argues that denial of interest deductions
would make it easier for part of the tax to be shifted to the consumer. For a sampling
of the recent literature on the incidence of the corporate tax, see Cragg, Harberger &
Mieszkowski, Empirical Evidence on the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax,
75 J. POL. ECON. 811 (Stipp. 1967); Gordon, The Incidence of the Corporation Income
Tax in U.S. Manufacturing, 1925-62, 57 Am. ECON. REV. 731 (1967); Musgrave & Krzyzaniak,
Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax in U.S. Manufacturing: Comment, 58 AM.
EcoN. REV. 1358 (1968); Oakland, Corporate Earnings and Tax Shifting in U.S. Manu-facturing, 1930-1968, 54 REV. ECON. & STAT. 235 (1972); Spencer, The Shifting of the
Corporation Income Tax in Canada, 2 CAN. J. ECON. 21(1969).
139. See Harberger, Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income From Capital, in EFFECTS
OF CoRPORATION INcOME TAX 107 (M. Krzyzaniak ed. 1966), for an attempt to estimate
the efficiency costs of distortion caused by differential taxation of corporate capital.
But see Taxation and Cost, supra note 116, at 33.
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tax base would be to discourage investment below the pretax level
when other aspects of the corporate tax structure, such as accelerated
depreciation and the investment tax credit, are considered. A pioneer-
ing analysis of corporate taxation and investment incentives concluded
that interest deductibility coupled with one-year depreciation for debt-
financed assets would raise investment incentives above their pretax
level; 140 it does not necessarily follow that elimination of the deduc-
tion would discourage investment below the pretax level. Even if
corporate investment would be reduced by including interest pay-
ments in the tax base, that result derives from the decision to levy
a tax on corporate income in the first instance. Unless there were
some reason to discriminate in favor of debt financing,141 whatever
reduction in investment were thought undesirable could best be
remedied by lowering the tax rate applicable to corporations. 42
A more sophisticated version of the argument that repeal of the
corporate interest deduction will distort the allocation of corporate
investment is implicit in an economic model developed recently by
Stiglitz.' 43 Accepting the proposition that in the absence of taxation
the debt-equity mix has no effect on a firm's decisions as to projects
in which it should invest,144 Stiglitz explores the possibility that tax-
induced changes in financial structure also have no effect on these
corporate investment decisions. He concludes that where bankruptcy
is not a contraint, the corporate tax advantages which accrue from
interest deductibility are offset by shareholder tax advantages, espe-
cially the possibility of deferring realization, which are peculiar to
equity. Thus, a corporation's financial structure may be affected by
the joint product of corporate and shareholder tax effects, but its op-
timal investment decision is unaffected by the present tax structure.
When bankruptcy is introduced as a constraint, optimal decisions for
a high debt firm in a world with corporate taxes differ from those
which are optimal in a nontax world, but Stiglitz concludes that the
distortion is not significant.
If the corporate interest deduction is necessary to maintain eco-
nomic efficiency given the possibility of shareholder deferral of taxa-
140. Brown, Business Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, EM-
PLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 300, 314-15 (L. Metzler ed. 1948).
141. See note 110 supra.
142. L. THUROW, THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 31-34 (1971),
summarizes econometric studies of the additional investment in plant and equipment
produced by reducing effective corporate income tax rates. See also Lintner, Effect
of Corporate Taxation on Real Investment, 44 Am. EcoN. REv. 520 (Supp. 1954).
143. Taxation and Cost, supra note 116, at 1; Risk and Allocation, supra note 116,
at 294.
144. See note 95 supra.
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tion on returns to equity, Stiglitz's analysis implies that elimination
of the interest deduction might lead to inefficiency. The assumptions
of his model-especially the postulates that losses can be completely
offset under the tax and that depreciation allowances are equal to true
economic depreciation 14--make this implication subject to some of
the objections raised against the less sophisticated version of the in-
efficiency argument rejected above. If, on the other hand, the Stiglitz
model is accepted as a close enough approximation of reality for
policy purposes, the elimination of interest deductibility would have
to be accompanied by one of two corollaries in order to avoid ineffi-
ciency. One would require that equity gains be taxed as they accrue
rather than as they are realized; this procedure would tax gains to
equity-holders in the same way that interest is taxed to debtholders.
This alternative has been suggested several times as a general tax
reform, 46 but has never been enacted. The second corollary would
require that interest be taxed to bondholders as equity gains are to
shareholders. Since Stiglitz's model depends for its efficiency results
on the ability of shareholders to defer taxation of capital gains on
equity, and not on the availability of a preferential tax rate, nonrec-
ognition of interest received might be extended to bondholders who
reinvest the interest in comparable bonds of the same corporation.
Such a provision has several analogues in the current Code. 47 Thus,
objections based on the Stiglitz model, which attempts to account
for both personal and corporate tax provisions, could be overcome
by providing for the nonrecognition of reinvested interest payments
or the taxation of unrealized gains on corporate stock.
2. Discrimination Against Incorporation
It has also been suggested that denial of interest deductibility for
corporations alone would result in discrimination in favor of unin-
corporated businesses, 148 presumably creating a disincentive to incor-
145. Taxation and Cost, supra note 116, at 1, 2, 4. Economic depreciation and full
loss offsets might, of course, be entirely desirable attributes of the income tax. See
generally Taubman 9- Rasche, Economic and Tax Depreciation of Office Buildings, 22
NAT'L TAX J. 334 (1969); warren, The Deductibility by Individuals of Capital Losses
Under the Federal Income Tax, 40 U. Cr. L. REv. 291 (1973).
146. See, e.g., Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly
Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967).
147. If reinvested in comparable 'assets, taxation of gain is deferred when the re-
ceipts are from an involuntary conversion, INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1033, the sale of
a principal residence, id. § 1034, or the disposition of certain low income housing
projects, id. § 1039.
148. Miller, supra note 98, at 440. Stiglitz's model assumes that whether or not a
firm incorporates is not affected by tax considerations, or if the decision is affected,
that the resource allocation implications are not significant. Taxation and Cost, supra
note 116, at 33 n.38.
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porate. That a separate tax on corporate income, but not on the in-
come of unincorporated businesses, discriminates against incorporation
should surprise no one. If such discrimination is unwarranted, appro-
priate responses include broadening the tax base to business income
generally149 or repeal of the separate corporate income tax. If a sep-
arate tax is to be levied solely on corporate income nonetheless, dis-
crimination against incorporation would be minimized by an across-
the-board reduction of the corporate tax rate, not by introduction of
an additional discrimination against equity.
C. Effect on Financial Stability
Finally, immediate elimination of the deduction for corporate in-
terest payments has been opposed because marginal firms might be
plunged into bankruptcy and previously successful firms transformed
into marginal ones.5 0 Prospective elimination has also been consid-
ered objectionable because it might discriminate against new busi-
nesses.15 1 The shock of withdrawing the interest deduction from cor-
porate taxation and any potential discrimination could, of course, be
mitigated by gradually phasing out the deduction over a transitional
period. 152
Even with such transitional adjustments, however, elimination of
the interest deduction is bound to have a differential impact on cor-
porate taxpayers. That some corporations will be relatively better or
worse off than under the existing provisions is to be expected from
almost any change in the statute. Such changes in position should be
regarded as undesirable only if existing tax differentials are deemed
preferable-a view precluded in this case by the foregoing analysis.
The legitimate claim of reliance on an admittedly imperfect statutory
structure can be discharged by adequate transitional provisions.
Conclusion
Originally conceived as a temporary concession to the World War I
excess profits tax, full deductibility for corporate interest payments,
coupled with the nondeductibility of dividends, has since been a per-
149. See generally Caplin, Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business Organi-
zation: Is It Time for a "Doing Business" Tax?, 47 VA. L. REV. 249 (1961).
150. R. GOODE, supra note 12, at 178; D. SMITH, supra note 106, at 25-26; Ford,
Some Economic Aspects of the Present Corporate Income Tax, 40 NA'L TAX ASS'N
CONF. PROC. 55, 60 (1947): Lent, supra note 8, at 140; Miller, supra note 98, at 439-40;
Plumb, supra note 7, at 625. See also May, supra note 112, at 17.
151. See Miller, supra note 98, at 439-40; Plumb, supra note 7, at 625.
152. May, supra note 112, at 18.
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sistent problem of the federal tax on corporate income. The propri-
etorship differences between debt and equity on which differential
treatment supposedly turns are dubious, and thus present no solution
to the problem. The net income rationale for interest deductibility re-
quires identification of a concept of corporate net income; when the
available concepts, increment in value, accounting income, and the
product of corporate assets, are examined, no corollary mandates the
interest deduction. The rationales which are said to support the cor-
porate income tax also provide little guidance as to the appropriate
treatment of payments for corporate capital. Unless the current tax
base were narrowed to undistributed earnings, the reasons given for
taxing corporate income conclusively suggest only that such payments
should be treated equivalently, in whatever form the capital is pro-
vided. The functional equivalence of debt and equity, the litigation
imbroglio, and the tax incentives for debt (to the extent such incen-
tives are significant) also argue for equivalent treatment of interest and
dividends. Congress is extremely unlikely to enact a dividend deduc-
tion; such improbability transforms the argument for equivalent
treatment into one for repeal of the interest deduction. Provision for
adequate transitional rules, imputation of interest where administra-
tively feasible, and similarity of realization treatment for shareholders
and bondholders if required by considerations of economic efficiency
could minimize any anticipated adverse effects of repeal while pro-
viding a more logical solution to the debt-equity dilemma.
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